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WITNESSES, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CREDIBILITY
OF TESTIMONY*
RALPH SLOVENKO**

The primitive method of settlement of matters in dispute was by
fist or club. Might made right. Witnesses played no role in the
settlement of disputes. Gradually, the concept of a trial evolved with
its rules regarding the competency of witnesses and the admissibility
of evidence. The early method of deciding disputes, though, has
influenced the development of the rules of procedure, and within
this evolving framework various psychological notions have been used
to assess the credibility of testimony.
THE

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Let us briefly look at the legal framework as it has developed
through the centuries. In the golden days of Athens (5th and 4th
centuries B.C.), trial was by battle of words rather than by arms, but
trials of that period were more in the nature of a morality play, designed to educate rather than to resolve a dispute. A predominant
feature of the legal structure was the use of courts consisting of 501
citizens or "dicasteries" in criminal cases and 201 in civil cases.
Orators for a fee provided parties with suitable speeches to be memorized and delivered by the parties themselves or by a friend,'
The primitive method of resolving disputes was employed during
a great part of the middle ages (and, as everyone knows, even today
in deciding international disputes). A characteristic feature of feudal
law was trial by battle. In any important case - as, for example, a
disputed claim to land or an accusation of unjustifiable homicide - a
feudal court normally left the issue to be determined by judicial combat between the principals or their legally appointed champions. In
knightly array, the two fought it out and the vanquished, if still
alive, suffered whatever penalty the law prescribed. An early and
*Presented in the Lecture Series on History of Psychiatry, The Menninger
Foundation, February 18, 1966, and published with permission of the Bulletin of
the Menninger Clinic. The paper, in abridged form, appears simultaneously in
the Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic.
**B.E. 1948, LL.B. 1953, MA. 1960, Ph.D. 1963, Tulane University; Professor
of Law, The Menninger Foundation and the University of Kansas School of Law.
1. SAW , LAW IN SocxTr (1965).
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graphic illustration is provided by the Song of Roland - the duel
between Thierry and Pinabel to decide the fate of Ganelon. 2
Around A.D. 1100, ambitious princes resorted to the political
system of Athens and republican Rome to support and expand their
jurisdiction.3 The point of the jury at this time was to give support
to the King's administrative officials and later to his traveling justices
in their efforts to extend the jurisdiction of the King's courts throughout England. It drew to the aid of the judges the strong men of the
locality and, unlike our modern jury, these men had, or were supposed to have had, information regarding the matters in issue. 4 At
this stage, as in ancient Athens, the jury had the aspect of being a
group of witnesses as well as of being a determining body. 5 These
functions were not split as they are today. Interesting to note, the
original meaning of the word "juror" is that of a man who took an
oath and swore to declare truly what he knew or believed in a given
case. There were no rules concerning the way in which the jurors
acquired their knowledge.6
During this period the independent witness was thought of as an
intermeddler and was in peril, if he intervened, of being held guilty
of maintenance. The advent of the modern witness took place in the
16th century, the time of the end of the feudal order. From then on,
for one thing, disputes were no longer provincial matters. For another, the jury gained in importance and became a symbol of political
freedom. The Elizabethan Act of 1562 7 which created the statutory
offense of perjury and provided for compulsory attendance of witness,
initiated a new epoch in the law of evidence. Thereupon, the facts
of the case were presented by outside witnesses and not by members
of the jury. Previously the jurors were to know everything about the
case, now they were to know nothing of it. The tabula rasa dictum,
soon to be current in philosophy, found judicial application.
Initially, however, these outside witnesses still were received with
2.

STEPHENSON, MEDIAEVAL FEUDALISM 34 n.7 (1942).
3. In England, Henry II in the twelfth century offered trial by inquest of
local inhabitants in many of the common classes of dispute concerning title to
land, so undermining both feudal and old local jurisdictions, and he also required
local inquests to report the occurrence of the more serious crimes over which the
Crown claimed jurisdiction and to present for trial suspected offenders. The
criminal inquests at first led to trial by ordeal, but the Lateran Council of 1215
prohibited priests from providing the religious supervision that had come to be
regarded as necessary for an effective ordeal. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY 77 (1965).
4. Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1965).
5. The jury's verdict was meant to be of aid to the judge in pronouncing his
judgment, but it was not binding on him.
6. Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv.
759, 761 (1965).
7. 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, 1562.
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some circumspection as possible perjurers, and if there were any
reason to suspect that the witness might be inclined to lie he was
considered incompetent to testify. 8 The common law borrowed
heavily from the canon law regarding the designation of persons as
incompetent, to serve as witnesses. Holdsworth in his History of
English Law points out: 9
The canon law rejected the testimony of all males under fourteen and females under twelve, of the blind and the deaf and
the dumb, of slaves, infamous persons, and those convicted of
crime, of excommunicated persons, of poor persons, and women
in criminal cases, of persons connected with either party by
consanguinity and affinity, or belonging to the household of
either party, of the enemies of either party, and of Jews,
heretics and pagans.
The grounds of incompetency, as developed through the centuries,
have been broadly categorized under five 1's:
(1) interest - a witness pecuniarily interested in the outcome of
the cause, a party or otherwise, was not allowed to testify because
of the temptation to falsify;
(2) insanity - he was considered not to have the mental capacity to testify;
(3) infancy - a child was considered incompetent to understand the nature of an oath or to narrate with understanding the
facts of what he has seen;
(4) infidelity - a person who did not believe in a Supreme
Being who was a rewarder of truth and an avenger of falsehood
was deemed incapable of taking an oath and therefore of testifying;
(5) infamy -part of the punishment for crime in early common law was to render the guilty person infamous and, among
other rights, he lost the right to testify in a court of law.
In addition, at common law, a wife was not permitted to testify for
or against her husband because in theory husband and wife were one,
and that one was the husband.
A number of basic reforms were accomplished during the 17th
century,10 and major reform also occurred during the 19th century,
8. Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IowA L. Ray. 482, 491-92 (1939).
9. HomsWoRTn, HistoRY OF ErGLIsa LAw 186 (3d ed. 1927).
10. In 1641 Parliament passed an act abolishing "the Court commonly called
the Star Chamber," and with the restoration of Charles II in 1660 the judges began

to create a number of provisions of the modem law of evidence. They ruled that
no man could be forced to incriminate himself, confessions must be voluntary, and
hearsay, except in special circumstances, must be excluded. See Souacas OF OUR
LmRTms 132-33 (Perry ed. 1959).
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in a large measure stimulated by the writings of Charles Dickens.,'
Today, the rules on competency of witnesses have nearly disappeared
and in their place we have the general principle that any person of
"proper understanding" is a competent witness. 12 The rules on competency have been converted into rules of credibility. The question
of competency is a preliminary one for the trial judge whereas once
allowed to testify, the witness's credibility is a matter for the jury.
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY

The rules of evidence, including the method of challenging credibility, may appear to be an affront to common sense, but as Chief
Justice Vanderbilt once remarked, "The entire history of the law of
evidence has been marked by a continuous search for more rational
rules first as to the competency of witnesses and then as to the admissibility of evidence."'1 3 Courts frequently point out: "The rules
of evidence were designed to obtain the truth. They are intended to
exclude testimony that is unreliable, such as hearsay, and testimony
1
that is false and dishonest.'
By "truth,"

the lawyer accepts

the

"common sense"

or corre-

spondence theory of truth. The problem of selectivity in the process
of knowing, so well depicted in the Japanese film Rashomon, is relegated to philosophy.- 5 And the concept of the Anglo-American sys11. The famous trial scene in the case of Bardell v. Pickwick emphasized the
absurdity of the rule prohibiting parties from giving evidence. DICKENS, THE
POSTHUMOUS PAPERS OF THE PICKWICK CLUB ch. XXX (1837).
12. LA. REV. STAT. §§13:3665, 15:461 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233,
§20 (1956).
13. Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., I N.J. 304, 317, 63 A.2d 515, 521
(1949) (concurring opinion).
14. Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. The Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 322 (1944).
James Marshall in Law and Psychology in Conflict (1966) says: "[T]hough U. S.
trials are aimed at discovering the truth and dispensing justice, the parties to
the trials are really seeking triumph and justification. The very phrase 'adversary system,'" he points out, "denotes a bitter duel rather than a disinterested
inquiry. Worse," he says, "the duelers tend to indulge in trickery, and fight with
'make believe' evidence that often bears scant relation to the facts at issue."
Book Review, Time, July 15, 1966, p. 58. Consider also: "Doctors are trained to
discover medical truth, while lawyers are trained in expounding a point of view.
(The best ones can believe passionately in every client's case, including the cases
of great rascals.) Their truth-finding genius is not individual, it is institutionalthe adversary system- and the record of Congressional investigating committees
has long since established that the mere presence of skilled lawyers and legal
trappings does not produce truth." Graham, Reports on the Report, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1966, §7 (Book Review), p. 3.
15. Rashomon (In the Forest) concerns a double crime-a rape and a murder
-told from four points of view. Flashbacks picture the testimony at the trial and
four different reenactments of the incident are given. Which is the correct one?
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tern is that truth is best discerned by application of the rules of
evidence in an adversarial proceeding, a procedure well suited
to the popular American conditioning to games. The witness may
feel that he goes through an ordeal just as harrowing as the ancient
ordeal by battle. In various ways the witness is placed under stress,
because it is believed that the imposition of stress aids in the ascertainment of truth-whether the witness be shy or bold. The unfamiliar courtroom procedure and legal language are built-in stress
factors imposed on the witness. At one time the witness had to stand
(from which derives the expression "the witness stand") and that
increased the witness's anxiety. The witness must swear to tell the
truth, and he may be subjected to a vigorous cross-examination. 16
The courts frequently say that "cross-examination of a witness is one
of the principal and most efficacious tests which the law has devised
for the discovery of truth."'1
In this setting, what role does the psychiatrist or psychologist have
to play in the search for truth? One psychologist observes:' s
When a reader comes upon a statement in the introductory
pages of a psychological text, as he frequently may, that one
of the practical applications of psychological science is the
evaluation of testimony, he readily accepts the statement as
true and reads quickly on, with a quiet glow of satisfaction that
Where are the "hard facts"? The onlooker's version is presumably the correct
one, but he too turns out to have an emotional involvement in the horrifying
scene. Kant said reality could be known only through the forms of the mind. See
Slovenko, The Opinion Rule and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1, 3 (1959).
16. The chapter titles in one book on cross-examination include: "Break Your
Witness," "Step by Step Attack," "Witness on the Run," "The Kill," "Shock Treatment," APPLniAN, CROSS-EXAMINATION (1963).
17. See, e.g., Aluminum Indus., Inc. v. Egan, 61 Ohio App. 111, 22 N.E.2d
459 (1938). Most lawyers are convinced of the efficacy of cross-examination. Louis
Nizer in My Life in Court says: "Cross-examination elicits the truth in innumerable ways- by forcing the witness to abandon his prepared positions and improvise under circumstances of stress, by inducing the witness to elaborate his inventions, by striking down the inventions and leaving the witness exposed, so that
the truth is his only available alternative. The resourceful techniques for dislodging a lie are as many as an agile mind can devise. Cross-examination is the
only scalpel that can enter the hidden recesses of a man's mind and root out a
fraudulent resolve. Psychiatry and drugs may have given us new insights into
motivation, but the classic Anglo-Saxon method of cross-examination is still the
best means of coping with deception, of dragging the truth out of a reluctant
witness, and assuring the triumph of justice over venality." NIZE, My LIFE IN
COURT 566 (1961). Nizer, though, goes on to say that "the psychological aspects
are intriguing and limitless." Id. at 366.
18. Rouke, Psychological Research on Problems of Testimony, J. Social Issues
No. 2, 1957, p. 50.
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science is such an aid in the search for truth and justice. Although it is true that psychology can and should render such
service to society, it is an unfortunate paradox that so little has
been actually accomplished. There is a surprising lack of work
in this area.
One may assume that a better test of truthtelling is needed or is
available than the unsound psychological notion expressed, for example, by one trial judge - "wiping hands during testimony is almost
always an indication of lying." 19 In the years preceding World War
I, there was considerable interest in Europe, especially in Germany,
in the psychology of testimony. Sigmund Freud in 1906 delivered a
lecture to a law class at the University of Vienna entitled Psychoanalysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law in which
20
he said:
There is a growing recognition of the untrustworthiness of
statements made by witnesses, at present the basis of so many
judgments in Courts of Law; and this has quickened in all of
you, who are to become judges and advocates, an interest in a
new method of investigation, the purpose of which is to lead
the accused person to establish his own guilt or innocence
objectively. This method is of a psychological and experimental character, and is based upon psychological research; it is
closely connected with certain views which have only recently
been propounded in medical psychology.
The task of the therapist, Freud said, is the same as the task of
the judge - he must discover the hidden psychic material. "To do
this," Freud said, "we have invented various methods of detection,
some of which lawyers are now going to imitate." However, Freud
cautioned: "It is necessary to consider some points of difference in the
psychological situation in the two cases."21

19. Reversed in Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1933). Consider also a recent hearing for alimony, where the husband said he paid $111
monthly on a loan. The wife's lawyer asked him what he did with the loan, and
he replied that he spent the money on race horses and gambling. "That's an
honest witness," remarked the judge. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan. 22, 1966,
p. 1, col. 3. It is generally believed that a damaging statement ("a statement
against interest") must be true. The self-destructive tendencies of people are
ignored.
20. FREUD, Psychoanalysis and the Ascertainment of Truth in Courts of Law,
in 2 COLLEC

PAPERS 13 (1906).

21. Compare also Gandhi's observation: "You can wake up a man who is
asleep, but if he is merely pretending to be asleep, your efforts will have no effect
upon him."
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With the neurotic, the secret is hidden from his own consciousness; with the criminal it is hidden only from you. In the first
we have a genuine ignorance (although not altogether complete), whilst in the latter this ignorance is merely simulated.
Connected with this is another difference more important in
practice. In psycho-analysis the patient consciously helps to
overcome his resistance because he expects to gain something
from the investigation -cure. The criminal, on the contrary,
does not cooperate with you; he would be working against
his whole ego. As a compensation for this, however, you are
only endeavoring to arrive at a conviction objectively; whereas our therapy demands that the patient himself should also
arrive at the same conviction subjectively. It remains to be
seen, however, how far your difficulties are increased or altered
by the lack of cooperation on the part of the subject; for this
is a situation which you can never bring about in your class
experiments, since your colleague, playing the part of the accused, is, in spite of his conscious determination not to betray
himself, your co-worker and assistant.
Looking more deeply into the comparison of the two
situations, it will become clear to you that on the whole psychoanalysis is concerned with the simple, special form of the problem of discovery, of hidden material in the mind; whereas in
your profession, on the other hand, the problem is a much
broader one. The case of the psychoneurotic is regularly concerned with a repressed sexual complex (in the wider sense
of the term), but this is a difference which does not concern
you. There is another point, however, which does. The aim of
psychoanalysis is identical in all cases; the analysis aims at
laying bare the complexes which have been repressed as a
result of the painful feelings associated with them, and which
produce signs of resistance when there is an attempt to bring
them into consciousness. The resistance is localized; it arises
at the boundary between the unconscious and the conscious.
In your case, we are concerned with the resistance originating
entirely within the conscious life. You cannot simply discount
this difference. You must first determine experimentally whether the conscious resistance betrays itself by exactly the same
signs as the unconscious resistance does ....
Was Freud, while cautious, naive in his assumption that psychoanalysis has something to offer in the ascertaining of truth in courts
of law? 22 Freud failed his examination in medical jurisprudence22. Bernard Diamond interprets Freud's essay as saying that the use of psy-
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his only failure, 23 but Freud was a genius, and generally was not
naive about the law. At one time he seriously considered the study of
law instead of medicine, perhaps because of the discrimination and
persecution that he himself endured. He was intensely interested in
law and in criminal behavior, but apart from his lecture on psychoanalysis and the ascertainment of truth, he was exceedingly pessimistic about the possible application of psychoanalysis to the legal
process.

24

Shortly after Freud's lecture, in 1908, in a book entitled On the
Witness Stand, Hugo Munsterberg, Professor of Psychology at Harvard, suggested that prospective witnesses should be tested in experimental situations to demonstrate their reliability before their testimony be accepted in court. He took the legal profession severely to
task for its failure to apply psychological principles to the evaluation
25
of testimony:
choanalysis for the obtaining of legal evidence is of a highly experimental nature,
that it should be utilized only in the spirit of research, and that the results should
never be allowed to influence the verdict of the court. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 63 (1961). That is not, however, my appreciation of Freud's essay.
23. JONES, 1 THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 27 (1953).
24. In 1922, the son of an old servant of Freud shot his father, though not
fatally, while the latter was in the act of raping the youth's half-sister. Freud
wrote a memorandum saying that any attempt to seek for deeper motives would
only obscure the plain facts. JONES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 88.
In 1924 Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune offered Freud $25,000 or
anything he would name to come to America to "psychoanalyze" Leopold and
Loeb, and presumably demonstrate that they should not be executed. Hearing
that Freud was ill, Hearst was prepared to charter a special liner so that Freud
could travel undisturbed by other company. Freud declined both offers. Freud
in reply said, "I would say that I cannot be supposed to be prepared to provide
an expert opinion about persons and a deed when I have only newspaper reports
to go on and have no opportunity to make a personal examination." JoNES, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 103.
On another occasion, Freud in a letter of November 4, 1920, from Vienna to
Dr. Emil Oberholzer said: "My appearance as expert witness in the litigation
concerning [not against] Wagner Jauregg didn't exactly mean the beginning of a
new p[sycho]a[nalytic] era for Vienna. On the first day of the litigation, while I
was present, the learned counsel behaved ever so sweetly. They used my absence
the next day in order to bring out all the old, poisonous lies against p[sycho]a[nalysis]. I neither reacted myself, nor did I admit any reaction from another
source...." Letter From Sigmund Freud to Dr. Emil Oberholzer, Nov. 4, 1920,
on file in the Menninger Museum, Topeka, Kansas.
25. MUNsTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 9 (1908). Munsterberg went on to
say: "[W]hile the court makes the fullest use of all the modern scientific methods,
when for instance a drop of dry blood is to be examined in a murder case, the
same court is completely satisfied with the most unscientific and haphazard
methods of common prejudice and ignorance when a mental product, especially
the memory report of a witness, is to be examined..
MUNSTERBERG, op. cit.
supra at 44-46.
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The time for such Applied Psychology is surely near ... . The
educator will certainly not resist . . . . The physician today
doubts still less that he can be aided .... It is also not difficult
Even the business world begins to
to convince the artist ....
the officer, the minister . . .
.
.
The
politician,
.
.
understand

all are ready to see that certain chapters of Applied Psychology
are sources of help and strength for them. The lawyer alone
is obdurate. The lawyer and the judge and the juryman are
sure that they do not need the experimental psychologist ....
They go on thinking that their legal instinct and their common
sense supplies them with all that is needed, and somewhat
more. And if the time is ever to come when the jurist is to
"The Courts will have to learn ... that the individual differences of men can
be tested today by the methods of experimental psychology, far beyond anything
which common sense and social experience suggest. Modem law welcomes, for instance, for identification of criminals, all the discoveries of anatomists . . . . But
no one asks for the striking differences as to those mental differences which the
psychological experiments on memory and attention . . . have brought out in
The judges ignore the
the last decade. Other sciences are less slow to learn ....
fact that with the same [quantitative] accuracy [as in food materials] their comMUNsrERBRG, Op.
mon sense can be transformed into careful measurements.
cit. supra at 63-66.
"[I]t is surprising and seems unjustifiable that lawyers and laymen alike
should not have given any attention, so far, to the methods of measurement of
association which experimental psychology has developed in recent years. . . . In
every one of these fields the psychological experiment could be made helpful to
The chronoscope of the modem psychologist
the purposes of court and law ....
has become . . . for the student of crime what the microscope is for the student
The doctrine of 'association' has become adjusted to the practical
of disease ....
problems ... of law.... [B]y it the secrets of the criminal mind may be unveiled.
All this has of course no legal standing today. . . . But justice demands that
truth and lies be disentangled. The time will come when the methods of experimental psychology cannot longer be excluded from the court of law. It is
well known that the use of stenographers in trials once met with vehement opposition . . . the idea of the psychological expert in court cannot be withdrawn
from public discussion. The mental life . . . plays too important a role in court
procedure to reject the advice of those who devote their work to the study of
these functions." MUNSTERBERG, op. cit. supra at 76, 82, 108, 117.
"It seems indeed astonishing that the work of justice is ever carried out in
the courts without ever consulting the psychologist and asking him for all the
aid which the modem study of suggestion can offer." MUNSTERBERG, op. cit. supra
at 194.
James Marshall, lawyer, in his recent book Law and Psychology in Conflict
(1966), finds: "[']he U.S. trial system guilty of woeful ignorance of elementary
psychology. Not only is truth highly elusive in 'a field dominated by hostility,'
he says, but the law wrongly assumes that witnesses can 'see accurately, hear
accurately and recall accurately.' Man is so subjective, he says, that the law's
naive reliance on his 'factual' testimony is almost laughable." Book Review, Time,
July 15, 1966, p. 58. See also Bolles, Criminal Law and Experimental Psychology,
in CRIME, LAW AND COP.ECTIONS 346 (Slovenko ed. 1966).
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show some concession to the spirit of modern psychology, public opinion will have to exert some pressure .

. .

. My only

purpose is to turn the attention of serious men to an absurdly
neglected field ....
Professor John Wigmore, whose name is synonymous with the law
of evidence, quickly took Professor Munsterberg to task. In an article
satirically cast in the form of a lawsuit against Munsterberg for defamation against the legal profession, Wigmore asked: "[W]here are
the exact and precise experimental and psychological methods of
ascertaining and measuring the testimonial certitude of witnesses and
the guilty consciousness of accused persons?" Tell us, Wigmore urged,
about the methods that might be applicable to judicial practice. Wigmore pleaded ignorance to the exactness and practical utility of these
wonderful methods, which the legal profession had persisted in rejecting or ignoring.26
THE

Hiss

TRIAL

Over a half-century has elapsed since the publication of Munsterberg's book and Wigmore's critique, 27 and it was not until the spectacular Hiss trial of the early 1950's that the issue of psychiatric
evaluation of a witness again attracted much attention.28 Alger Hiss,
Chairman of the Carnegie Foundation for Peace, and the fair-haired
boy of the Democratic Party, was accused by Whittaker Chambers
of passing secrets to Communists in the 1930's. The fate of the Democratic Party was at stake; Senator Joe McCarthy had charged the
Democratic Party with twenty years of treason. The defense offered
psychiatric testimony designed to impeach the credibility of the
government witness, Whittaker Chambers. Judge Goddard, ruling
the psychiatric testimony admissible, said: 29
26. Wigmore, Professor Munsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL.
L. REV. 399 (1909).
27. One year after Munsterberg's publication, in 1909, Whipple authored a
series of annual reviews that extended, with the exception of the year 1916, through
1917. Two books with the same title Legal Psychology appeared, one in 1926
and the other in 1931, the former by Brown, the latter Burtt's popular work. A
comprehensive review of the field of legal psychology was written by Slesinger
and Pilpel, in 1929, with particularly complete bibliographical information.
Slesinger & Pilpel, Legal Psychology, 26 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 677 (1929). For
a review of GORPHE, LA CRITIQUE DU TESMOIGNAGE see Slesinger, Book Review, 37
YALE L.J. 399-403 (1928). Beyond these, there is a mere scattering of articles
reporting experimental studies or commenting upon the relative status of law
and psychology. See Rouke, Psychological Research on Problems of Testimony,
J. Social Issues, No. 2, 1957, p. 50.
28. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
29.

Ibid.
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It is apparent that the outcome of this trial is dependent, to
a great extent, upon the testimony of one man-Whittaker
Chambers. Mr. Chambers' credibility is one of the major issues
upon which the jury must pass. The opinion of the juryformed upon their evaluation of all the evidence laid before
them-is the decisive authority on this question, as on all
questions of fact. The existence of insanity or mental derangement is admissible for the purpose of discrediting a witness.
Evidence of insanity is not merely for the judge on the preliminary question of competency but goes to the jury to affect
credibility.
Dr. Carl Binger, psychiatrist, testified that Chambers was a "psychopath with a tendency toward making false accusations." Binger
testified that his first opinion was based on "personal observation of
Mr. Chambers at the first trial for five days and one day at this
trial" and that "he had read plays, poems, articles and books reviews
by Mr. Chambers and books he had translated from German."
On cross-examination, Binger's testimony was decimated. As so
often happens, a fabric is made to look meaningless when every
fiber is scrutinized. The forest is lost for the trees. Binger on direct
examination had pointed out Chambers "untidiness," and on crossexamination he was made to acknowledge that the trait was found in
such persons as Albert Einstein, Heywood Broun, Will Rogers, Owen
D. Young, Bing Crosby, and Thomas A. Edison. Binger testified
that Chambers habitually gazed at the ceiling while testifying and
seemed to have no direct relation with his examiner. The prosecutor
in a turnabout told Binger: "We have made a count of the number of
times you looked at the ceiling. During the first ten minutes you
looked at the ceiling nineteen times; in the next fifteen minutes you
looked up twenty times, for the next fifteen minutes ten times, and
for the last fifteen minutes ten times more. We counted a total of
fifty-nine times that you looked at the ceiling in fifty minutes. Now
I was wondering whether that was any symptom of a psychopathic
personality?" Shifting uneasily in the witness chair, Binger replied,
"Not alone." Binger had testified that stealing was a psychopathic
symptom, and the prosecutor asked him: "Did you ever take a hotel
towel or Pullman towel?" Binger replied, "I can't swear whether I
did or not, I don't think so." The prosecutor thereupon asked: "And
if any member of this jury had stolen a towel, would that be evidence
of a psychopathic personality?"
Would you have believed Whittaker Chambers? The jury did.
He was earning 30,000 dollars a year as senior editor of Time Magazine up to December 12, 1948. His family, however, had no social or
community ties. His grandmother, who went around the house
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brandishing a carving knife, was put in an asylum; his grandfather
was an alcoholic; his father was unfaithful to his mother; his brother
committed suicide; and Whittaker himself made an unsuccessful attempt at "self-execution" (his own label) prior to the first Hiss trial.
Binger gave his opinion after listening to a seventy-minute hypothetical question "that accentuated unpalatable aspects of Mr. Chambers'
30
life."
Today, some fifteen years later, Binger reflecting on the Hiss case
says: 31
My opinion of Chambers and the Hiss trial was based
almost entirely on the seven volumes of sworn testimony which
he deposed in Baltimore before the trial. This was an exposition of a life so irregular and so delinquent that one could
only interpret it as the story of a psychopath. Many of my
psychiatric friends agreed with me in this decision, but were
less willing to expose themselves to ridicule and contumely
than I was. Perhaps they were wiser. But I never regretted
my stand nor had I any serious doubts about Hiss' innocence.
I did suspect some hidden, unconscious relationship with
Chambers, of which I believe Hiss was unaware, and that this
led him into an involvement which might well have looked like
a conspiracy. He certainly never gave signed state documents to
Chambers .... The prosecutor, Mr. Murphy, who looked like

a dumb cop, turned out to be highly astute and tricky. He resorted to all kinds of subterfuges to trip me up. He tried to
turn words around in my mouth and forced me to answer "yes"
and "no" to questions framed by him in such a manner that the
answers did not convey the meaning that I wished to present.
I know that this is all part of the game, but it seemed to me
shocking and preposterous. I had only one wish and that was
to tell the truth and not lose my temper. I think I did both.
Mr. Murphy, on the other hand, was determined to try to have
me lose my temper and to distort the truth.
COMPETENCY OF PSYCHIATRY IN ASSESSING CREDIBILITY

Where do we go from here? According to orthodox doctrine,
proof of character is limited to reputation evidence. For example,
the California Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to criminal as
well as to civil trials, specifies: "[A] witness may be impeached by the
30. New York Times, Jan. 6, 1950, p. 1, col. 2. See Falknor, Hiss Case: Impeachment by Psychiatric Testimony of Expert, in 1950 ANN. SURVEY ANT. L. 804.
31. Letter From Carl Binger to Ralph Slovenko, Nov. 23, 1965. (Quoted with
permission.)
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party against whom he was called . . . by evidence that his general

reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he had
been convicted of a felony."3 2 Should evidence of character pass from
3
the "crucible of the community" to the "couch of the psychiatrist"? 3
The question today is most frequently raised in sex offense cases
where the credibility of the accused or the prosecuting witness is in
question. The "victim" frequently is a child of such early age that
the report often cannot be considered reliable.34 In other cases, the
accused and the prosecuting witness may both contend that they have a
good reputation for morality in the community and that they are
beyond "lewd lascivious conduct." The vindictive or rejected person
may want to hurt the ex-friend by involving him in a legal procedure.
The model code of evidence and the uniform rules of evidence, adopted
in some states, would allow not only reputation evidence but also
opinion evidence as to the character of the accused in a criminal
action. This rule makes it clear that the opinion rule as such should
not operate to exclude the belief of a character witness whose conclusion as to the accused's character is based on personal acquaintance.

35

Is a psychiatrist competent to measure credibility? The courts
uniformly reject results of lie detector tests, truth serum tests, and
drunkometer tests. 36 Henry Davidson, psychiatrist, says that psychiatrists can play a major role in the administration of justice by
appraising the competency of witnesses37 There is a strong emotional
component in the motivation and memory of witnesses, Davidson says,
.and it thus represents an area that should fall within the special field
32.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

§§2051-52 provides for impeachment by prior in-

consistent statements.

33. This phrase is used in the state's "Supplemental Memorandum" to People
v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954) cited in Falknor & Steffen, Evidence
of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the "Couch of the
Psychiatrist," 102 U. PA. L. RPv. 980, 982 n.4 (1954).

34. Compare Bielecki v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 355, 145 S.W.2d 189 (Crim.
App. 1951) (aggravated assault by indecent fondling, girl of 6 incompetent) and
Cross v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 249, 64 S.E.2d 727 (1951) (girl of 6 incompetent
to testify as to rape), with People v. Peck, 314 Ill. 237, 145 N.E. 353 (1924) (crime
against nature, boy of 7 competent to testify) and Carter v. State, 87 Tex. Crim.
299, 221 S.W. 603 (Crim. App. 1920) (assault with intent to rape, children of
6 and 7 held competent to testify).
35. 7 WIGMOR, EvFisNcE §1986, at 166 (3d ed. 1950).
36. E.g., Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) (truth serum);
People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) (lie detector test); People v.
Knutson, 17 Ill. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (2d Dist. 1958) (drunkometer test).
37. Davidson, Appraisal of the Witness, 110 AMERICAN J. PsYcHIATRY, 481
(1954).
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of the psychiatrist. Observation is selective and in large part is dependent upon the condition of the observer and upon his inner motivations. To give effective and accurate testimony a witness must observe intelligently, remember clearly, speak coherently, and be free
of any emotional drive to distort the truth; and the analysis of these
traits, he says, should be a job for the psychiatrist.
The major clinical conditions affecting testimonial capacity,
Davidson says, are the psychosis, mental deficiency, drug addiction,
alcoholism, personality disorders, certain organic involvements of the
brain, and sometimes certain forms of psychoneurosis. The schizophrenic sometimes can report an event with carbon-paper fidelity,
but schizophrenics make unreliable witnesses because they have defective observation, distorted memory processes, and they may even
have paranoid ideas. A senile psychotic is unreliable as a witness
because of the frequency of delusions of infidelity, impairment of
memory, and delusions of ingratitude. The hypomanic is a dangerous
witness because he says things with such plausible positiveness, but
as every psychiatrist knows, the things he says can be of the stuff
that dreams are made. The drug addict may not be a good witness
because he may be under the toxic influence of a drug, or his testimony may not be reliable because the issue happens to concern his
source of supply. The mental defective may make an adequate witness if the event is one that can be described simply, but most events
are complex involving many subtle details, and here the defective
is a poor witness because of his deficient powers of observation and
his inability to paint a vivid verbal picture. The-alcoholic is often
at the mercy of mixed and unpredictable emotions, and the memory
defects of chronic alcoholics are well known to psychiatrists. The
psychopath will twist his tongue to say anything. Among psychoneurotics, recessional states or depressive reactions may result in distorted interpretations of events.38
Paranoid patients, if not deteriorated, may sound as if they are
talking good sense, but their testimony may be part of the delusional
39
network. Ralph S. Banay, psychiatrist, says:
The problem of the paranoid personality offers an illustrative example of the usefulness of psychiatric testimony, especially in civil cases. Paranoids, who have a marked proclivity
for getting into legal difficulties, often make a favorable appearance in court when not crossed or agitated, and they may
impress the untrained observer as rational and sincere. They
could conceivably mislead a judge, an attorney or a jury, into
38. Davidson, op. cit. supra note 37.
39. Banay, The Psychiatrist in Court, in CRIME, LAW AND CORRECTIONS 433
(Slovenko ed. 1966).
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the sincerity of their claim, but they would less likely deceive
a clinically experienced psychiatrist. Similarly, in many borderline cases or in maladies of obscure manifestation, the root of
the trouble may be discernible to the clinician although it is
hidden from other observers.
One law -writer says that psychiatric diagnosis should be admitted
whenever it is offered to show the unreliability of a witness, whether
based on clinical examination or courtroom observation alone. He
suggests that the psychiatrist may sit with a cross-examining attorney,
at the counsel table, and in this way he writes: "[T]he psychiatrist
may direct the cross-examination, thereby approximating a personal
interview with the witness."40
But 'what does a psychiatrist learn from a courtroom observation
of the witness? He may observe the witness's mood, pressure of talk,
stream of thought, brightness, content of thinking, memory. But an
attorney's method of interrogation is exactly the wrong way for a
psychiatrist to make an evaluation of an individual. In the courtroom, nobody believes anybody. The aura of cross-examination (with
its implication of hostility and adversity of interest) provides an
emotional climate far different from the ideal psychiatric interview.
The witness feels attacked and abused, and this immediately elicits
defense mechanisms that can only shut out or distort pertinent
psychiatric material.4 '
In the case of State v. Driver,42 in 1921, a twelve-year old girl,
upon whom an attempted rape was alleged to have been committed,
was called as a witness. The defendant offered to show by the testimony of a psychiatrist that the girl was a moral pervert and not trustworthy. On the basis of courtroom observation, the expert would have
testified that he would have classified the girl as a lying moron and
unworthy of belief. The evidence was designed to be an attack
upon her truthfulness, aimed at her credibility, and the inference to be
drawn from the testimony, if it had been permitted, was that she was
an habitual and confirmed liar because of her mental defectiveness.
43
The court refused to hear the proffered evidence and said:
[A] person's knowledge of an assailed witness' reputation,
gained alone from what has been said against him on the trial,
or from his conduct on the trial, is not sufficient to render him
competent as a character witness. It was attempted to make the
40.

Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59

YAL L.J. 1324 (1950).
41. Monroe, The Psychiatric Examination, in
439 (Slovenko ed. 1966).
42. 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921).

CRIME, LAW AND CoRmErONs

43. Id.at 488, 107 S.E. at 192-93
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expert competent by showing that he had partially heard the
evidence, had observed the girl on the stand, had concluded
that she was a moron of the class of liars, and hence unworthy
of belief. We are not convinced that the time honored and
well settled and undefined rule of impeachment of the veracity
of a witness should be thus innovated upon. It is yet to be
demonstrated that psychological and medical tests are practical,
and will detect a lie on the witness stand.
To vary the facts of the State v. Driver case, take the case of a
strictly reared single woman in her late twenties. She meets a young
man at a social gathering and, following some pleasant conversation,
he offers to take her home. She accepts, but he drives to a secluded
spot. She says that her memory was a "complete blank" from that
time until sometime later when she recalls finding herself with her
head in his arms. Let us assume that she regularly sees a psychiatrist.
On the day following the alleged incident, she sees her psychiatrist
and, still in a very anxious and overwrought condition, she tells him
that she was raped. Now suppose this event becomes the subject of
prosecution, and the psychiatrist is asked to give his opinion whether
she was raped. The psychiatrist knows her to be an hysterical woman
and regularly mixes fact with fantasy, but he also knows that
44
hysterical women are not immune from rape.
A psychiatrist may not be able to detect a lie on the witness stand,
but is he able to detect it when the witness has talked over the matter
with him in psychotherapy? Theodor Reik in his book The Unknown
Murderer says that psychoanalysis has no contribution to make to
evidence of guilt, as it is concerned with mental (inner) reality rather
than material (outer) reality. A therapist does not check on material
reality. He is ordinarily concerned with the patient's view of the
world rather than what the world actually is. He does not cross-question the patient. Some therapists say that outside information about
the patient interferes with their clinical work, and they prefer to close
44. In a number of cases the courts have permitted psychiatrists to expose
mental defects, hysteria, and pathological lying in sex prosecutrices. See, e.g., Mell
v. State, 133 Ark. 197, 202 S.W. 33 (1918); Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571
(1916); People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929). Examples of use
of psychiatry in cases other than sex cases: Coffin v. Reichard, 148 F.2d 278 (6th
Cir. 1945) (hospital records showing that appellant in habeas corpus proceedings
as a psychopathic personality); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir.
1945) (extrinsic evidence that a witness has been in mental institution held admissible to impeach); People v. Hudson, 341 Il1. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930) (testimony of three experts that a principal witness (age forty-two) in an arson case
was a moron); Pool v. Day, 143 Kan. 226, 53 P.2d 912 (1986) (expert testimony
that plaintiff-witness suffered from "retrograde amnesia"); Bouldin v. State, 87
Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920) (exclusion of evidence that prosecuting
witness in robbery case was feebleminded, held erroneous).
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their eyes to it. They know the situation only through the eyes of the
patient. Something more, then, is needed to test veracity. 45
In the Hiss case, Binger had neither Hiss nor Chambers as a
patient in psychotherapy. He did not use Hiss's character as a basis
of his testimony. He did not testify on behalf of Hiss that "in view
of Hiss's character, it is unlikely that he would do such a thing." His
testimony went to the credibility of witness Chambers. In response to
a lengthy hypothetical question, he arrived at a diagnosis of Chambers
of psychopathic personality, based on twelve symptoms as follows:
(1) repetitious lying, (2) stealing, (3) withholding the truth, (4) insensitivity to the feelings of others, (5) play acting and assuming false
names, (6) bizzare and unusual acts, (7) vagabondage, (8) instability
of attachments, (9) panhandling, (10) abnormal emotionality, (11)
4
paranoid thinking, and (12) pathological accusations.
RELIABILITY OF TESTIMONY

Well now, who is reliable? Children are not terribly reliable.
Mental defectives are not reliable. People with organic brain disease
45. In a recent case in Denmark it is reported that the accused committed a
crime while hypnotized, and psychiatric examination brought it to light. "Young
Palle Hardrup was caught after a bank robbery, during which he had killed two
men. He insisted he had acted under orders from a 'guardian spirit.' Hardrup
did not seem to be a murderous type, but it took a psychiatrist months of questioning before he came to an astonishing conclusion. When Hardrup said he had
been obeying a guardian spirit, he was telling the truth. But the voice whose
orders he followed was not from another world. It was the voice of his friend,
Bjorn Schouw Nielsen, a hypnotist . ...
At the trial the jury concluded that
Haxdrup had not committed the crime of his free will. He was only an instrument,
carrying out suggestions which Nielsen-who thought he had discovered the
method for the perfect crime-had implanted in his mind. As a result, Nielsen
was sentenced to life imprisonment and Hardrup was sent to a mental hospital."
Muir, Can Hypnotism Defeat Justice?, True Magazine, March 1966, p. 41. How
did the psychiatrist detect that the accused was acting while hypnotized? By
looking into a crystal ball? By acting like a policeman? See Redlich, Ravitz &
Dession, Narcoanalysis and Truth, 107 AMERICAN J. PSYCHIATRY 586 (1950); Sadoff,
PsychiatricInvolvement in the Search for Truth, 52 A.B.A.J. 251 (1966).
46. Carl Binger observes: "The hypothetical question is an absurdity. An
expert witness is not allowed to testify to facts that he knows to be true but
only to assumptions which often leave out the important facts. From these he is
asked to draw conclusions. . . . Who is a reliable witness? This is for the jury
to decide. A man who is addicted to narcotics, who has been convicted of a
felony, who is a chronic pathological liar may, indeed, be a reliable witness- but
the jury should hear all the facts about him, not his response to a rigged hypothetical question. The truest thing that can be said of any man is that he will
probably continue acting the way he has always acted. If the jury had been allowed to hear Chambers' own sworn pre-trial testimony, it might have been less
credulous of his veracity at the trial." Letters From Carl Binger to Ralph Slovenko, Nov. 23, 1965, and Feb. 17, 1966. (Quoted with permission.)
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are not reliable. Psychotics are not reliable. Psychopaths are liars.
Obsessive compulsives deny various things and obviously they cannot
be very reliable about these things.
The law likes to keep things well organized. At one time the
law excluded large groups of people as incompetent to take the stand
- the five I's - interest, insanity, infancy, infidelity, and infamy. Now,
instead of the old categories, the law is replacing them by new ones by psychiatric categories. Popular disapproval of drug addiction and
chronic alcoholism is so strong that it is imprudent to depend upon an
addict as a witness. The courts say: "[T]he habitual use of opium
is known to utterly deprave the victim of its use, and render him
unworthy of belief." 47 "We believe it will be admitted that habitual
users of opium, or other like narcotics, become notorious liars. The
habit of lying comes doubtless from the fact that these narcotics users
pass the greater part of their life in an unreal world, and thus become
unable to distinguish between images and facts, between illusion and
realities."' 8 A minority of courts take the position that addicts as
such are predilected toward untruthfulness and, by so holding, the
court takes away the jury's prerogative to assess credibility.49
Obviously, though, no one can judge the reliability of a group
of people as a class. It is expeditious but a great error to generalize for example, to say that a person is an alcoholic and then to exclude
him on the ground that alcoholics are not reliable witnesses. Many
persons are "alcoholics" (or have an alcoholic problem) even if they
have not drunk any alcohol in a year or more. Many persons who
have an alcoholic problem hold most responsible positions and are
reliable when not drinking to excess. If we were to disqualify alcoholics as reliable observers, we should disqualify many judges, lawyers,
psychiatrists, and clergymen. But suppose, instead of deciding on the
basis of class, we consider each individual as an individual, and we
try to understand the way that he has reacted to various situations
and how reliable his stories have been under various circumstances.
Would that be of any help in resolving disputes?
Lawyers are specialists in verbal communication, but psychiatrists,
specialized in listening with the third ear, are concerned about unconscious motivation and nonverbal communication. To understand
the reliability of such people supposedly calls for knowing something
about their unconscious motivation. Lawyers usually deal only with
conscious things. Of course, lawyers such as Perry Mason read between
the lines. They understand unconscious motivation though they may
not call it that.
47.
48.

State v. Concannon, 25 Wash, 327, 65 Pac. 534, 537 (1901).
State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236 (1916).

49. Comment, 34 TUL. L.

REv.

389 (1960).
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Getting down to a practical, if personal, level we all have known
friends who are not alcoholic or addict or psychopath, but when they
make out their federal income tax it becomes very questionable
whether they are reliable. There are times when everyone is not reliable and, on the other hand, there are individuals who put down
everything conceivable on their income tax return. They are overly
scrupulously honest. Shall we say that they are reliable honest
people? The psychiatrist looks behind the scene and asks why does
a person have to be so honest? Shakespeare said: "The lady doth
protest too much, methinks" and was reading behind her protestations. When somebody is so scrupulously honest, he is worried about
his own dishonest tendencies as he really does not trust himself too
much. An individual may be very compulsive in getting everything
absolutely right and always sure that he is good and always being sure
that he is clean, et cetera, but when we look carefully at him we may
find that underneath his clean shirt he has not bathed or wears dirty
underwear.
RELATIONSHIP OF MAN'S BIOGRAPHY AND

His

MESSAGE

What is the relationship of man to his message? Philosophy traditionally has taught that words lead an independent life. Under
the correspondence theory of truth, the relation studied is strictly
that between the statement and the world. Personalizing is ruled out
under the well-known ad hominem objection - but, we may ask, does
the ad hominem objection need reevaluation? What is the relationship between ideas, mentation, and biography? A person gains in
understanding his own philosophy and ideas by an examination and
analysis of his mental processes and motivations, as psychoanalysis may
attest. Do we likewise, in examining the philosophy or message of
another person, add a dimension by understanding his personality?
Man's message reveals the man; contrariwise- does man reveal the
message?
It is known, for example, that Immanuel Kant's neighbors set
their clocks by his routine, as his obsessive ideas would predict.
Schopenhauer, too, is known to have been an obsessional neurotic.
jean Jacque Rousseau's "noble savage" and "state of nature" may be
linked with his psycho-sexual infantilism, which expressed itself also
in exhibitionistic, narcissistic, and homosexual trends. Bishop Berkeley's idealism and denial of reality may be tied in with his attitudes
regarding excretion. Nietzsche's mother was hereditarily tainted.
Hegel's philosophical system begins where repression is involved,
where thesis turns into anthithesis. Thomas Szasz's concern over the
authoritarian psychiatrist may stem out of his early battle over the
potty.
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Is such biography helpful to a study of the message? It is necessary,
it seems, to distinguish the various functions of language - informative, expressive, directive - that is, to transmit information, to induce
mood, and to promote action. There are different criteria for evaluating each function: truth and falsehood for the informative; sincere
or insincere, valuable or otherwise for the expressive; and proper or
improper, right or wrong for the directive. In psychoanalysis, among
all disciplines, there is the fullest exploitation of the genetic dimension; psychoanalysis links genesis with the present, but that is for
the purpose of treatment. Biography or genesis has little relevance
to a person's message if the message is to be evaluated in terms of
truth and falsehood. The fact that Kant's neighbors set their clocks by
his afternoon walks has no logical bearing upon the truth or informative significance of his philosophy. From his character, we may surmise that he would ponder his statements at length, but the psychological origin of a belief or the motive for holding it or the condition
that leads to its acceptance is irrelevant to its truth or falsehood. The
chemist who invented the "benzene ring" dreamt the night before of
a snake with its tail in its mouth. The theory of benzene rings is not
to be equated with the dream of a snake. Likewise, Freud's explanation of how belief in God is born need not be inconsistent with
that belief. A message is substantiated by the available evidence, not
by its genesis.
However, if the function of a message is expressive and directive
as well as informative (and usually all three functions are included)
then - since criteria other than truth and falsehood are involved in
its evaluation - biography should not only be helpful but essential to
an evaluation and understanding of the message.
The court is essentially concerned with the informative function
of a message, and the fact that an individual may be an unreliable
witness does not imply that he will be unreliable, and no witness is
completely unreliable at all times. However, the courtroom process
is a practical one and when testimony conflicts and the evidence of a
witness is crucial, the ad hominem approach may be practically - but
not theoretically - justified. In the mundane world, it is not only
what a witness says but how he says it and who he is that is important. This is not epistemology. To look at a man, including his
sacroiliac, is a matter of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense
of justice. It is a question of fair judgment, and it is thought that
psychiatry may lend a hand in reaching that judgment. Yet, as
pointed out, there are a number of factors in the legal setting that
make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to obtain a reliable psychiatric
evaluation. A psychiatric evaluation usually rests on the complete
trust between the patient and psychiatrist. This trust implies that
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the psychiatrist is totally on the patient's side, will not reveal information the patient has confided, and will be primarily concerned
with the patient's welfare rather than that of society.
Freud in his essay pointed out that a psychiatrist with a patient is
different from a lawyer with a witness. A psychiatrist can afford to be
"hoodwinked" because if the psychiatrist does not believe the patient
he will never get anywhere with him. The patient may say that he
can hoodwink the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist will agree with
him that he can. The patient is not hurting the psychiatrist. He is
hurting himself rather than protecting himself. This is different on
the witness stand. There, by an attempt to hoodwink, the witness
seeks to protect rather than to hurt himself.
A good poker player probably knows better than a psychiatrist
whether a person is lying. A psychiatrist is a doctor, not a lie detector.
A lawyer too has his shortcomings as an investigator. Perhaps Perry
Mason solves a case on the stand (he also solves cases out of court),
but skillful interrogation and evaluation can more likely take place
in the police station than in the courtroom. However, such a procedure is against our tradition of law enforcement. In the case of
Leyra v. Denno,50 the defendant after being questioned by the state
police for the greater part of four days concerning the murder of his
aged parents, complained of an acutely painful attack of sinus. The
police promised to get a doctor, but they got a psychiatrist with a
considerable knowledge of hypnosis. Instead of administering medical
aid, the psychiatrist, working in a room that was wired, "by subtle and
suggestive questions simply continued the police effort" to get the
accused to admit guilt. The Supreme Court invalidated the confession obtained by the psychiatrist and denounced the admission of
statements made to the psychiatrist as "so clearly the product of
mental coercion that their use as evidence is inconsistent with due
process."
It is an open question whether a trial court has the power to
order a witness to submit to psychiatric examination; 51 the refusal
to order a psychiatric examination has invariably been held not to be
an abuse of discretion. 52 And what sanctions does the court have
available to compel obedience to an order to submit to an examination? Rule 85 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar
state statutes 53 authorize trial courts to order a physical or mental
50. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
51. In criminal cases, see Danford, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 489 (1965).
52. E.g., Teche Lines v. Boyette, 111 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1940); Strasser v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1 F.R.D. 125 (D.C. Ky. 1939); Lucas v. Williams,
218 Md. 322, 146 A.2d 764 (1958).
53. E.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. (CIV.) R. 35; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.29; MD. R. PRo. 420;
MINN. R. Cirv. P. 35.
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examination of a "party" when his physical or mental condition is
"in controversy," that is, to determine injury sustained by a party
in a personal injury suit. The Rule probably does not include
psychiatric examination as to credibility, especially of an ordinary
witness, as credibility is not a matter directly "in controversy." The
power to order a psychiatric examination, although not provided by
statute, may be said to be part of "inherent" or "implied" judicial
power,5 4 but even in rape cases the courts have been hesitant to order
5
psychiatric examination of prosecuting females. 5
CONCLUSION

To obtain an ideal climate for an effective psychiatric evaluation
a number of legal reforms would be necessary that might be unwise
either from a social or legal point of view. 56 If this is the case then
psychiatrists and jurists should realize the limitations that the legal
procedure places on the accuracy and effectiveness of the psychiatric
examination and, in turn, on the psychiatric opinion. 57 But is psy54. State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
55. Weihofen, Testimonial Competency and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 55, 76 (1965).
56. One major obstacle to the use of psychiatric evaluations at trial is the
physician-patient privilege. Statutes granting such a privilege are in force in many
states and would prevent the treating psychiatrist from testifying as to the credibility of his patients. See SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION (1966); 8 WIG1MORE, EVIDENCE §§2380-91 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
57. The legal inquiry differs from the scientific inquiry for a large number
of reasons. In a splendid article, Cowan, Jurisprudence in the Teaching of Torts,
9 J. LEGAL ED. 444 (1957), Professor Cowan points out a few of these reasons:
"I. Legal facts are selected quite differently from scientific facts. In law, fact
gathering is left pretty much to the decision of mutually antagonistic parties.
The law has deep reasons of policy for this practice, but such reasons do not
motivate men of science. They select facts with a view to supporting or weakening hypotheses. 2. Our system of screening data (the rules of evidence) was developed and persists for reasons that pertain to the legal craft and have little
effect in the realm of science. 3. The major purpose of every case is to reach an
end to an individual controversy rather than to contribute to the development
of a general theory. The work of science, on the other hand, is a corporate
effort that has for its purpose the growth of a body of general principles. 4. The
law's method of arriving at a result often is purposely non-scientific. Frequently,
the results are announced as the general, flat, unsubstantiated decision of untrained
minds purposely selected for their lack of training (jury). 5. The fundamental
aim of law is justice; that of science is knowledge. At times, these aims are
parallel, but often they diverge.
"In general terms, law is an art, not a science. Its methods are adversary,
not cooperative. Its results are primarily practical, and only secondarily theoretical.
Its aim is justice, not truth." Cowan, supra at 455.
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chiatry here being used more for its prestige value than for its
probative value?58 And who is the reliable witness? Just thee and
me, and I am not so sure about thee and thou are not so sure about
me.

58. For discussion of other legal misuse of psychiatry, see Slovenko, Psychiatry,
Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963 DUKE L.J. 395; Slovenko,
The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 121 AMERICAN J. PsycHATRY 534
(1964) exanded version in 13 KAN. L. REv. 59 (1964); Slovenko, And the Penalty
is (Sometimes) Death, 24 ANTIOcH RPv. 351 (1964).
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